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Abstract This paper examines the compensation systems for industrial accidents
in Belgium, Germany and Great Britain, thereby taking into account some recent
empirical data on industrial accident rates and (although hardly available) amounts
of compensation paid out to employee victims. The key question of this paper,
derived from past research in law and economics, is whether these particular
compensation systems include elements that may contribute to the prevention of
industrial accidents. While the three countries examined here all have at least some
incentive-based elements, notably in the way those systems are financed, there
appears to be room for improvement both in Belgium and Great Britain. The
German case study leads to the proposition that giving an organisation the
responsibility for both compensation and prevention may have a beneficial effect on
the accident rate.
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1 Introduction
With respect to compensation for personal injury caused by industrial accidents,
several ‘‘compensation systems’’ exist. These range from, on the one hand, private
systems based mainly on tort law and (first or third party) insurance, to, on the other
hand, public systems such as social security and no-fault compensation funds. In
practice, sometimes a combination of private and public elements is chosen; e.g.,
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employee victims receive some basic compensation via social security, and have to
resort to tort law for additional compensation. Moreover, the differences between
public and private systems are sometimes smaller than they seem at first sight, e.g.
when a public fund is to a large extent financed by employers who have to take out
direct (third party) insurance on behalf of their employees in the private insurance
market.
This paper considers in more detail the different compensation systems used in
three European countries: Belgium, Germany and Great Britain. The key question
that will be adressed is to what extent these particular compensation systems include
elements that may contribute to the prevention of industrial accidents. After all, the
extensive law-and-economics literature that discusses the various compensation
systems (tort law, insurance, workers’ compensation, etc.) generally argues that
these systems should give incentives to prevent accidents, both to employers and
employees.1 One may however, wonder whether the compensation systems found in
practice really are ‘‘incentive-based’’.
In the existing law and economics literature, empirical data on the effects of
compensation systems on prevention are to a large extent lacking. The explanations
for this are rather straighforward: (1) it appears to be difficult to find data that can be
used to measure prevention of industrial accidents, and (2) there are many other
factors (in addition to the compensation system itself) that influence the accident
risk, and these are often equally difficult to measure. Although the goal of this paper
is not to solve these problems, some modest data will be presented showing (to the
extent possible2) industrial accident rates and amounts of compensation paid out to
employee victims in the three countries under review. On the one hand, this short
empirical exercise will point out some of the difficulties in the data-collecting
process. On the other hand, to some extent the (modest) data presented below may
show whether the different compensation systems used in each of these countries
could have had an effect on prevention. However, as mentioned earlier these data
may also suggest us to look for other factors that could have influenced the number
of industrial accidents, such as safety regulation, changes in the economic structure
and demographic trends.
This paper is set up as follows. In the next Sect. (2) I will present a law-and-
economics framework, mainly by recapitulating the well-known economic literature
on the different compensation systems. Although prevention and compensation can
be considered as different policy objectives, systems designed mainly for
compensating accident victims may have preventive effects as well. After having
presented the theoretical law-and-economics framework, the three case studies will
be presented: Belgium (Sect. 3), Germany (Sect. 4) and Great Britain (Sect. 5). Each
of these sections starts with a short explanation and analysis of the compensation
system for industrial accidents in that particular country, and then moves to a short
empirical part. Section 6, finally, will provide some concluding remarks in the light
of the law-and-economics framework presented earlier, as well as suggestions for
1 See, for example, Danzon (1987), Ko¨tz and Scha¨fer (1993), Dewees et al. (1996) and Shapiro (2000).
2 I will point out below that sometimes empirical data, especially on tort claims and settlements, are
hardly available.
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further research. An in-depth comparative analysis of the three countries under
review is, however, not possible, for the simple reason that the collected empirical
data cannot be compared directly. Different definitions of what exactly constitutes
an industrial accident are used in each country. Moreover, we have to keep in mind
that registration of industrial accidents is never perfect. Nevertheless, there appear
to be some common trends as regards the incidence and compensation of industrial
accidents.
2 A summary of the law and economics literature3
If employers and employees were able to perfectly assess the risks of industrial
accidents ex ante, they could allocate these risks in an efficient way by incorporating
risk premiums in wages.4 In that case the employer’s incentive to prevent industrial
accidents, by investing in safety and health precautions, would be embodied in the
wage premium. However, such an optimal allocation of resources would follow
only if transaction costs are zero or negligible. In reality transaction costs in the
labour market are of course not negligible. Dewees et al. (1996) argue that risk
premiums will not be set at the efficient level because of market failures in the
labour market. They refer in particular to information problems regarding the risks,5
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, and externalities
caused by fatal injuries.6 These are situations where indeed transaction costs in the
labour market are high.
Therefore, some kind of intervention in the labour market is required, in order to
create optimal incentives for employers and employees to reduce the accident risk,
and in order to compensate the victims of such accidents when they do occur; e.g. in
the form of tort liability, (mandatory) insurance, safety regulation, a compensation
fund, or social security. In practice, each country uses its own combination of these
and other instruments, as will be shown in the following sections for Belgium,
Germany and the United Kingdom. Here I will first, albeit very briefly, discuss these
instruments from an economic point of view. Section 2.1 focuses on tort law and
insurance, and Sect. 2.2 on no-fault compensation funds and social security.7
2.1 Tort law and insurance
Economists generally argue that a main objective of tort law is deterrence of
wrongful and dangerous behaviour, while lawyers tend to stress compensation as its
3 This section draws heavily on Philipsen (2007b).
4 This of course follows from the Coase theorem, which states that in the absence of transaction costs, an
optimal allocation of resources will always follow, irrespective of the the prevailing liability rule. Moore
and Viscusi (1990) discuss wages as a compensation mechanism for job risks.
5 On the modelling of underestimation of risks by workers, see Rea (1981).
6 Dewees et al. (1996), pp. 347–348. The authors also discuss some empirical literature on risk premiums
here.
7 The discussion here will be short in order to prevent too much repetition. Interested readers may turn to
Shapiro (2000), Shavell (2004), pp. 175–287, and Faure and Van Boom (2007).
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main goal. The deterrence argument is straightforward: if there is a (credible) threat
of a liability suit, potential injurers will behave more carefully, which will, ceteris
paribus, result in a lower accident probability or lower amount of damage.8 This
argument would apply in the labour market as well, as the threat of a liability suit
would give incentives to employers to take safety measures in order to prevent
accidents at the workplace. For example, Danzon (1987) argues that, with respect to
occupational risks, the design of liability rules should always consider their
prospective impact on incentives for prevention, in addition to two other factors that
have to be taken into account: exposure to uninsured risk and implementation
costs.9 Social security and no-fault compensation funds do not have such a deterrent
effect, unless they are backed by safety regulation or unless financial contributions
to the social security system or fund are made dependent on factors relating to the
accident risk.10 Whether, in practice, tort law is indeed an efficient instrument to
deter wrongdoing is still highly debated in the literature. Some US scholars have
suggested that the (American) tort system may lead to a claims culture and to
overdeterrence of risky activities, while others have claimed that tort law does not
deter unduly dangerous conduct at all. The former view is sometimes referred to as
the ‘‘jaundiced view’’ of tort law, while the latter has been labelled the ‘‘reassuring
view’’.11
Moving from prevention to compensation for a moment, a related question
presents itself: to what extent is tort law able to take care of the compensation of
industrial accident victims? Naturally, the answer to this question depends on
factors such as the determination of the causal link between the accident and the
losses (if proving causality is difficult, the chance of receiving compensation is
small), the amount and composition of compensation paid out via the tort system in
a particular country (e.g., does it also include moral damage?), and whether or not
there is a problem of insolvency (which can be related to the availability of
insurance). Making generalisations about the performance of the tort system with
regard to compensation is therefore difficult. Nevertheless, some scholars, among
them again Dewees et al. (1996), have suggested that tort law should only play a
residual role in compensating employee victims, for example, in addition to no-fault
insurance schemes.12
Tort law is often combined with some form of liability insurance. On the
one hand liability insurance may facilitate the compensation of successful
8 Here I implicitly assume that only the potential injurer can influence the accident risk (unilateral
accident setting). In a bilateral accident setting, both the level of care taken by the injurer and the
potential victim must be taken into account. See e.g. the classic papers by Shavell (1980, 1984) and the
literature mentioned in footnote 7.
9 Danzon (1987), p. 280. This paper deals more specifically with occupational disease.
10 On the criteria that determine the choice between safety regulation and tort law, see Shavell (1984).
11 See in that respect the long ‘‘meta-review papers’’ by Saks (1992) and Galanter (1996, 1998), and a
reaction to those papers by Schwartz (2002). For a summary of this debate in the United States, see
Philipsen (2007b); Dewees et al. (1996), p. 414, argued that the deterrent effect of tort law is limited and
uneven, or cannot be established by existing empirical studies.
12 Dewees et al. (1996), p. 412. The authors refer to ‘‘cases of egregious behaviour causing serious
harm.’’.
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plaintiffs.13 Moreover, it protects employee victims against the insolvency of the
employer, whereas it also protects employers against the exposure to liability. On
the other hand, the availability of liability insurance may result in the well-known
problem of moral hazard. That is, the very fact that employers are insured may
undermine their incentives to prevent accidents in the workplace. Insurers can tackle
this problem by making the premium risk-related or experience-rated, or by
introducing deductables or upper limits in order to partially expose employers to
risk.14
Various authors have studied the deterrent effects of experience rating in the
workers’ compensation system, especially in the United States. Results are
contrasting, although the majority of studies seems to reach conclusions in line
with economic predictions. I will only mention three examples here.15 Chelius and
Smith (1983) found that experience rating, as used in the workers’ compensation
insurance arrangements, has no measurable effect on employer safety. However, the
authors indicate that they had to use a rather crude measure of marginal premium
cost. Moore and Viscusi (1990) reached a different conclusion. Based on an analysis
of fatal accidents, they conclude that the workers’ compensation system has been a
driving force in reducing fatalities in the workplace. Without workers’ compen-
sation and without tort, industrial fatality risks could have risen by more than 40%,
so they state. In that respect workers’ compensation would have had more deterrent
effects than safety regulation. Ko¨tz and Scha¨fer (1993) studied the sugar industry in
Germany. Their conclusion, which is in line with economic predictions, is that there
were far fewer accidents after the introduction of experience-rated premiums (in the
form of a system of rebates and surcharges) in the German workplace compensation
scheme than before. The authors attribute this to the economic incentives generated
by the the experience rating, which induced employers (in this case, the managers of
firms in the sugar industry) to take preventive measures.
2.2 No-fault compensation systems and social security
Other compensation systems, such as no-fault compensation funds and social
security, have also been discussed extensively in the law and economics literature.16
As stated above, no-fault systems and social security generally do not have any
deterrent effects unless the financial contributions to these systems are made
dependent on factors relating to the accident risk or unless they are combined with
safety regulation. This non-deterrence argument applies in particular to social
13 Abraham (2004), p. 1. Note, however, that still an employee victim will only receive compensation
when the employer is actually held liable.
14 On experience rating in workers’ compensation systems, see also Klein and Krohm (2006), pp. 17–20.
The authors present a table (p. 6) containing an overview of workers’ compensation systems and their
funding mechanisms in the ‘‘20 most populous countries in 2004’’.
15 Further references can be found in Dewees et al. (1996), p. 381, and Philipsen (2007b), p. 210.
16 For recent contributions to this literature see Faure and Van Boom (2007) and Faure (2007). As the
latter article makes clear, the dividing line between systems based on tort law supplemented by liability
insurance and social security systems is not always clear. If, for example, a direct insurance is concluded
by the employer to the benefit of its employees, this may be qualified as ‘social insurance’.
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security, which is generally considered as a ‘‘Existenzsicherung’’: i.e. providing a
basic (limited) compensation, whereas equal access to the system is usually
considered essential (which implies that there is no risk differentiation). No-fault
systems are somewhat similar, in the sense that accident victims do not need to
prove fault to receive compensation. However, in a no-fault system the link between
the accident and the particular fund must still be proven, which may be difficult in
some cases. Also, no-fault schemes generally favour particular kinds of accident
victims over others who may be similarly hurt by other kinds of accidents,17 which
cannot always easily be justified. Compare, e.g., falling from a ladder at home and
falling from a ladder at the workplace. There are, however, many different types of
no-fault compensation schemes with varying degrees of residual tort liability and
various types of compensation, so generalising is hardly possible.18
Compensation funds may be financed partly or primarily by means of employer
contributions. Obviously the line of reasoning applied above in relation to
insurance, applies again here: the more risk-related or experience-rated the
contributions are, the higher is the expected preventive effect on the industrial
accident rate.
3 Belgium
Industrial accident risks in Belgium are considered as a risque professionnel. There
is a no-fault insurance system, which is an integral part of the social security system
and which is paid for by employers collectively. The relevant legal provisions can
be found in the Arbeidsongevallenwet of 1971 (Industrial Accidents Insurance Act).
Employers have to take out private (third party) insurance to cover the risk of
industrial accidents on behalf of their employees.19 In case an employer is not
insured, the Fonds voor Arbeidsongevallen (Industrial Accidents Fund, FAO),
established by Royal Decree no 66 in 1967, steps in. Employee victims receive a
standardised compensation of lost income, as well as compensation for healthcare
costs. Non-pecuniary losses and property damage are not compensated via this
scheme. While payment is relatively swift and certain, the amounts paid out are
lower than they would be in tort law. Moreover, civil liability of employers is
generally excluded, except for intentional wrongs, property damage, and accidents
on the road to/from work.
In theory, the Belgian compensation scheme provides some incentives for the
prevention of industrial accidents. Namely, insurers may require additional safety
measures from their insured, i.e. the employers, and/or adapt the premium to the
17 McEwin (2000), p. 738.
18 A no-fault compensation system can be combined with private insurance. Social security is itself
considered a social insurance. For a brief discussion of the basic principles of private insurance and social
insurance, see Faure (1998), pp. 267–268. McEwin (2000) gives an overview of law-and-economics
literature on no-fault compensation systems.
19 Before 1971 the Belgian system was based on civil liability of the employer, the risk of which was also
born by employers collectively by means of private insurance. However, at the time such insurance was
not mandatory.
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individual accident risk. In 2006, however, the Belgian Minister of Employment and
Work proposed to make premiums more risk-related (see below), which implies that
at the time there was a feeling that there was still room for ‘improvements’ in this
area. For the purpose of prevention of occupational accidents and diseases in
Belgium, there is also a special multi-disciplinary institute called Prevent. Its main
goals are to promote the quality of working conditions and to improve the labour
organisation by providing support, advice and information to all actors involved.20
3.1 Number of accidents
According to the Industrial Accidents Insurance Act, employers are obliged to
report to their insurer all accidents leading to personal injury. The FAO keeps a
register of all such accidents in the private sector, based on information provided by
insurers.21 In 2004, the FAO registered 198,861 industrial accidents, including
21,370 on the road to and from work, 195 fatal accidents and 13,760 accidents
leading to permanent disability. The number of private, still active, insurers, has
decreased to 17 over the years. Collectively these insurers manage about 450,000
insurance policies and collect about € 918 million worth of premiums.22
In its General Report 2005, the FAO presents data on the total number of
industrial accidents in the private sector in the period 1985–2004. Four categories of
accidents are distinguished: without consequence (zonder gevolg),23 temporary
disability (tijdelijke ongeschiktheid), permanent disability (blijvende ongeschikt-
heid) en fatal (dodelijk). Table 1 shows a selection of these data.24 The numbers
suggest a decrease in all accident categories except permanent disability since the
early 1990s.
A better indication of industrial accident trends would be obtained by looking at
accident rates instead of absolute numbers. Table 2 shows the frequency of
industrial accidents in Belgium (excluding accidents without consequence), defined
as ‘‘the number of accidents per million of hours exposed’’.25 Obviously, the
accident rate has been decreasing in recent years.
20 http://www.prevent.be, 13 February 2007.
21 As of 2000 the FAO also registers public sector accidents. Detailed figures on public sector accidents
could until recently also be found on the website of the Federal Public Service of Employment, Labour
and Social Dialogue: http://werk.belgie.be/moduledefault.aspx?id=236. This is no longer the case.
22 FAO website: http://www.fao.fgov.be, 13 February 2007.
23 This category refers to minor accidents resulting in an absence from work less than one working day.
In many other countries, such accidents are not even recorded. Also, they are not included in the statistics
published by Eurostat (the treshold employed by Eurostat is ‘‘three working days lost’’).
24 Compiled from FAO, Algemeen Verslag: Dienstjaar 2005 (2006), 109.
25 Source: Prevent, Statistieken Arbeidsongevallen en Beroepsziekten ‘03’04 (2006), 8. The figures from
the FAO are provided by insurance companies and are available 6 months after the recording. The FAO
introduced a new computation method in 2000, which makes it impossible to compare the new
estimations with the pre-2000 data. The figures from the Federal Public Service of Employment, Work
and Social Concertation are provided through the annual reports of companies. It should be noted that the
representativity of the figures depends on the sector and that there is a time interval of 2 years until
publication of these data.
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According to the (then) Minister of Employment and Work, this decrease was
mainly due to the efforts of companies to create a safer working environment.26
Moreover, in 2006 the Minister announced the introduction of financial penalties for
companies with high accident figures. Such penalties could take the form of
‘‘prevention contributions’’: a fixed amount between € 3,000 and € 15,000,
depending on firm size. As regards the risk assessment, companies having more
accidents than the average of their sector during a period of 2 or 3 successive years,
will be considered ‘‘aggravated risks’’. Another proposal in order to increase work
safety was to make (more) use of experience-related premiums, i.e. relate the
Table 1 Number of industrial
accidents in the private sector
(1985–2004)
Year Number of industrial accidents accepted by insurers








1985 158,994 10,814 206 243,805
1986 154,756 11,944 178 239,412
1987 153,027 11,347 182 237,869
1988 163,595 10,647 169 249,247
1989 182,621 12,064 200 265,930
1990 190,318 12,195 184 276,281
1991 185,538 12,182 184 267,271
1992 173,981 12,133 156 250,959
1993 145,845 12,023 158 213,865
1994 138,913 12,518 152 206,518
1995 109,065 11,586 139 207,869
1996 101,216 11,177 119 196,637
1997 97,574 12,712 130 197,520
1998 103,262 12,258 138 202,274
1999 102,345 12,479 118 199,715
2000 108,409 13,128 139 209,508
2001 110,294 13,742 127 203,171
2002 96,385 11,710 121 184,252
2003 85,823 12,629 100 170,853
2004 82,559 11,751 122 165,472
Table 2 Frequency of industrial accidents in the private sector (1997–2004)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: FAO 31.79 33.50 27.77 35.50 35.02 31.23 28.45 26.98
Source: FPS ELS 35.99 35.82 35.61 32.66 30.15 27.98 27.31
26 It would be interesting to find out what caused the companies to invest in safety at the workplace.
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premium to some extent to the accident figures. However, both proposals were still
in a draft stage at the time of writing this paper.27
3.2 Compensation
The amounts of compensation paid out to employee victims in Belgium are
calculated on the basis of formulas. The compensation paid by insurers consists of
the basic wage (in case of temporary disability: 90% of the basic wage) multiplied
by a disability percentage. The FAO can be considered as a kind of safety net. It will
step in when employers are not insured, despite the legal obligation to take out
insurance on behalf of their employees. In such cases the FAO will usually try to
take recourse against the employer (which is difficult, as it often concerns
employers who have already left the market). In cases of permanent disability, a
standardised minimum compensation (minimumvergoeding) applies, which is
calculated as follows: basic amount 9 disability percentage 9 reassessment coef-
ficients 9 adjustment coefficients. A similar formula exists for benefits in cases of
decease. In addition, there are various kinds of supplementary payment (bijslagen).
The role of tort law in compensating employee victims is still rather limited, as civil
liability of employers is generally excluded.28
It turned out to be very difficult to gather information on the exact amounts of
compensation paid out by insurers. However, the institute Prevent provides an
estimation of the average costs of industrial accidents, based on amounts of
compensation paid out by insurers. For the year 2002 the average costs are
estimated at € 3,399 per accident and at € 5,878 if only accidents causing temporary
and permanent disability are considered.29 According to Prevent these numbers are
incomplete, because the ‘‘monetary reserves of insurers could not be taken into
account in the computations’’. Complete data are only available for the period
1989–1999 and are provided in Table 3.30 This table shows an increase in the
average costs of industrial accidents for almost the entire period, which can largely
be explained by the increasing costs of serious accidents. In 1999, for the first time,
the costs per accident decreased.
Table 3 Industrial accidents: average costs 1989–1999 (€)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2,618 2,640 2,739 2,995 3,418 3,694 3,924 4,130 4,279 4,321 3,912
27 Sources: contact person at Prevent and press statement Minister of Employment and Work:
http://www.petervanvelthoven.be/article.php?id=425, 13 February 2007.
28 There are, however, some legal procedures concerning questions such as the work-related nature of an
accident. See, e.g., Rauws (2001). Moreover, an anonymous referee argued that the situation in Belgium
is slowly changing, i.e. the role of tort law in compensating employee victims has increased somewhat in
recent years.
29 Prevent, Statistieken Arbeidsongevallen en Beroepsziekten ‘03’04 (2006), 26.
30 Source: additional information provided by Prevent (conversion from Belgian francs to euros by
author).
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4 Germany
The German Unfallversicherungsgesetz (Industrial Accidents Insurance Act) dates
from 1884. The compensation system is based on public insurance, paid for by
employers and managed by the Gewerbliche Berufsgenossenschaften (BGs). It
applies to all employees and their financial dependants, but does not apply to public
officials. The amounts of compensation paid out to employee victims depend on the
degree of incapacity for work and are limited in size. Both income losses (limited to
a maximum of two–thirds of lost wages) and medical costs (including rehabilitation
costs) are covered. However, there are almost no possibilities to take civil action
against employer or colleagues, with the exception of cases involving intent and
gross negligence. General risks of illness and personal injury, i.e. not being work-
related, are compensated via the Krankenversicherung (Health Insurance Act) and
the Rentenversicherung (Pension Insurance Act). The risks of commuting accidents
and occupational diseases have been included in the Industrial Accidents Insurance
Act since 1925.31 As from 1997, the Insurance Act has been incorporated in the
Socialgesetzbuch Buch VII (Social Code).32
The BGs play a central role in the German system. In 2007 there were 26 BGs,
organised along industry sector lines, each having its own autonomous adminis-
tration. Being the statutory accident insurance institutions, the BGs are responsible
for the provision of all rehabilitation services, controlling and co-ordinating medical
treatment, and reintegration into professional life and the social environment.33
Moreover, they have a legal duty to look after the prevention of occupational
accidents.34 If the rehabilitation measures provided by the BGs do not lead to the re-
establishment of unrestricted participation in working life, employee victims receive
a ‘‘pension’’. The amount of such a pension depends on the reduction of earning
capacity, as will be explained below.
The Hauptverband der Gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften (Central Federa-
tion of BGs, HVBG) represents the common interests of all its members. The
HVBG also decides on the contribution rates to be paid and preventive measures to
be taken by companies. The contributions (premiums) paid by employers are related
to an industry risk factor and to the total wages and salaries paid, and since the
1960s and 1970s these contributions have been made dependent also on the number
of accidents in the individual company. As discussed in Sect. 2, risk-related and
(especially) experience rated premiums would according to economic theory create
strong incentives to invest in safety at the workplace. In the following subsections it
will therefore be investigated whether the German system, with its emphasis on
prevention, indeed functions well in practice (although, of course, the data in itself
are not necessarily related to the ability of the compensation system to lead to
adequate prevention).
31 See also Van Dongen (1995), pp. 103–108.
32 Before 1997 it was included in the Reichsversicherungsordnung (State Insurance Code, 1911).
33 From HVBG website: http://www.hvbg.de, 13 February 2007. See currently http://www.dguv.de.
34 The prevention work carried out by the BGs includes inspections, trainings and information provision,
etc.
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4.1 Number of accidents
Registration of industrial accidents is, like in Belgium, inherent to the compensation
system. The yearly published statistics on industrial accidents are based on the
recording and reporting procedures for the accident insurance. The HVBG has
collected data on work-related accidents and diseases on a regular basis from 1978
to the present, and it also publishes various overviews and special studies. However,
accessibility to the database itself is restricted to HVBG personnel.35
Table 4 presents the number of reportable accidents at work (meldepflichtige
Arbeitsunfa¨lle) and the number of fatal accidents at work in the period 1994–2005, as
well as the number of new pensions resulting from a reduction in earning capacity or
fatal accident.36 Pre-1994 data are also available, but these cannot directly be
compared with the recent figures because of a change in the ‘‘statistical basis used in
accident insurance’’ in 1986 and the ‘‘inclusion of the new federal states in Eastern
Germany’’ in 1991.37 The data in Table 4, which do not include commuting accidents,
clearly indicate a decrease in the number of accidents and the number of new pensions.
Statistics on the accident rate show a decreasing trend as well. Table 5 presents
the number of industrial accidents per 1,000 full workers and per 1 million hours at
work.38 Pre-1994 data, available from the HVBG website as from 1965, show a
similar trend. In 1965 the accident rate per 1,000 full workers was 118.62, which is











1994 1,489,360 1,250 34,659
1995 1,415,381 1,196 34,464
1996 1,266,458 1,120 33,966
1997 1,221,530 1,004 28,135
1998 1,198,608 948 25,549
1999 1,185,382 977 24,338
2000 1,144,262 825 22,678
2001 1,060,625 811 21,354
2002 937,540 773 20,603
2003 871,145 735 19,646
2004 841,447 645 18,138
2005 801,834 589 17,414
35 European Health and Safety Database (HASTE): http://www.ttl.fi/internet/haste, 13 February 2007.
See also Jacinto and Aspinwall (2004), p. 943.
36 Source: Hauptverband der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften (HVBG).
37 HVBG, BG Statistics: Figures and Long-Term Trends 2003 (2004), 5. Nonetheless, the HVBG has
computed that since 1970, the number of ‘‘reportable accidents’’ has decreased by 56% and the number of
‘‘fatal accidents’’ by 75%: http://www.hvbg.de/d/pages/praev/index.html, 13 February 2007.
38 Source: Hauptverband der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften (HVBG).
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four times as high as the accident rate in 2005. The decline of heavy industry and
the closing of coal mines in Germany might be some of the explanatory factors for
this. In addition, it is likely that the decrease in the accident rate can be credited to
succesful prevention efforts by the BGs, as is also claimed by the HVBG on its
website.39
Furthermore, and most interesting within the context of this paper, the German
compensation system may have had some additional preventive effects, in particular
the risk-rated and experience-rated contributions by employers. In Sect. 2 I referred
to a German study by Ko¨tz and Scha¨fer (1993). The authors conclude that ‘‘there is
a highly significant statistical relation between the introduction of the system of
rebates and surcharges, and the reduction in the number of accidents’’.40 While their
study only considered the sugar industry (before and after the introduction and
refinement of the contribution adjustment system in the 1960s and 1970s), there is
no reason to assume that their results would not apply to some extent to other
sectors.
Interestingly, the average contributions paid to the BGs by employers have
remained stable or even declined slightly over recent decades. While in 1960 the
average contribution rate still amounted to 1.51% of wages and salaries, in 2003 this
figure had dropped to only 1.35%.41 Although it would be impossible to determine
whether this figure is close to the ‘‘textbook’’ economic optimum (i.e. where the
marginal costs of investing in safety equal the marginal benefits of a reduction in
accidents), it seems safe to conclude at least that the market forces inherent in the
German public insurance system are working fairly well.
Table 5 Reportable accidents
at work: accident rates (1994–
2005)
Year Accidents at work
per 1,000 full workers
Accidents at work













39 http://www.hvbg.de/d/pages/praev/index.html, 13 February 2007.
40 Ko¨tz and Scha¨fer (1993), p. 33.
41 From HVBG website: http://www.hvbg.de, 13 February 2007. It should be noted that the development
of the contribution rate differs with regard to the different branches. For example, the construction
industry faces a less favorable development of contributions.
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4.2 Compensation
All compensation for income losses to insured persons and surviving dependents is
paid out by the BGs. In other words, there is basically just one ‘‘compensation source’’
in Germany, in contrast to countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
where private insurance, tort law and public systems exist much more side by side. The
calculation of the ‘‘pensions’’ is standardised and is based on the gross annual earnings
(Jahresarbeitsverdienst) and the so-called MdE, which stands for reduction of earning
capacity (Minderung der Erwerbsfa¨higkeit). For example, if MdE is 100%, the insured
person will receive a ‘‘full pension’’, which amounts to two thirds of his/her (former)
gross annual earnings. Although tort law is not totally excluded, it does not play an
important role in the German compensation system, with the possible exception of
cases involving intent and gross negligence from the side of the employer.
While information on the amounts paid out to individual employee victims is not
available, it is possible to list the total expenses by the BGs. In 2005 a total of €
7.5 billion was spent on compensation, of which € 2.5 billion on rehabilitation and €
5 billion on pensions and other cash benefits. Furthermore, € 0.7 billion was spent
on prevention. The figures presented in Table 642 show a decrease in compensation
expenditures and a small increase in prevention expenditures in recent years.
5 Great Britain43
When it comes to seeking compensation for income losses caused by industrial
accidents in Great Britain, both tort law and social security are important.44
According to the Employers’ Liability Act of 1969, employers45 have to take out
liability insurance against the costs of compensation for employees who are injured
or made ill at work through the fault46 of the employer. The costs of compensation
may include loss of earnings, health care costs and pain and suffering. Prior to 1972,
i.e. the year the Employers’ Liability Act became effective, claims against
Table 6 Expenditure by BGs
(9 € billion)
2003 2004 2005
Prevention 0.728 0.734 0.733
Compensation 7.610 7.561 7.473
Rehabilitation 2.585 2.552 2.507
Pensions etc. 5.025 5.009 4.966
Administration and procedures 1.122 1.086 1.087
42 From HVBG website: http://www.hvbg.de/e/pages/statist/stat/aufw/index.html, 15 February 2007.
43 The data presented in this section refer to England, Scotland and Wales.
44 Klein and Krohm (2006), p. 11 argue that private employer liability insurance and public social
insurance ‘‘pay roughly equal shares of the indemnity for the workers’ compensation benefits’’ in Great
Britain.
45 Except for nationalised industries, the police and local authorities.
46 In Great Britian the employer’s civil liability must be shown by the claimant.
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employers often failed if the employer was not insured, because insufficient funds
existed. Now failure to insure is regarded as a criminal offence. The UK
Government believes that employer’s liability compulsory insurance (ELCI)
provides greater security both to firms (against costs which could otherwise result
in financial difficulty) and to employees (because compensation will be available
even when firms have become insolvent). ELCI would also support the right of
victim-employees to be fairly compensated and the responsibility of employers to
fund the costs of their negligence. Moreover, the Government believes that making
employers fund the cost of their negligence may have preventive effects. In that
respect, an additional preventive effect is expected from the monitoring and
interference by insurers.47
In 2003 the Government started a review of the Employers’ Liability Act,
because insurance premiums had risen significantly in the period between 2000 and
2003. Smaller businesses complained that the premiums did not reflect their good
health and safety standards and claims record; and that rather the premiums were set
on the basis of some standard book rate. The Government review pointed out that
the recent premium increases had been driven by a cyclical change in the insurance
market, increases in legal costs and (possibly) uncertainty over long-term risks.
However, one of the conclusions that followed from the review was the suggestion
to make premiums better reflect individual risk.48
Let us now turn to social security. The well-known National Health Service (NHS)
covers general health care losses and is financed mainly by public funds. However, it
is the National Insurance that covers the financial risk of injury arising in and out of
the course of employment.49 This National Insurance is financed by contributions of
employers and employees. Benefits consist of flat-rated payments for income loss
and medical treatment. In cases of disablement caused by industrial accidents the
Industrial Injury Disablement Benefit (IIDB) applies. Contrary to the employers’
liability system, IIDB does not involve fault being established. However, compen-
sation of income losses does not depend on the actual income loss but on the degree
of incapacity, and it is not payable for the first 90 days after an accident. Obviously
then, IIDB does not provide full compensation for loss of earnings.
IIDB and employers’ liability are separate systems. IIDB provides a safety net for
those victim-employees who choose not to pursue a claim against their employer
and for cases where liability cannot (easily) be established. In particular cases IIDB
may also be the means of support for employees while they pursue the more lengthy
process of employers’ liability claims.50
47 Department for Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Insurance: First Stage Report
(2003), 14, and Department for Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Insurance: Second
Stage Report (2003), 5.
48 See the Government reports mentioned above: supra, note 47. Compare also to the recent proposals in
Belgium, discussed in §3.1.
49 More generally: the National Insurance offers benefits such as the Incapacity Benefit, Retirement
Pension, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Maternity Allowance and Bereavement Benefit. See, e.g., http://www.
adviceguide.org.uk/index/life/benefits, 23 February 2007.
50 Department for Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Insurance: First Stage Report
(2003), 18.
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5.1 Number of accidents
Industrial accident statistics have been collected by the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) since 1986. The HSE is the enforcement authority working in support of the
Health and Safety Commission (HSC), which has been responsible for the regulation
of work-related health and safety risks in Great Britain since its establishment
following the 1974 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. The activities of the HSC are
sponsored by the Department of Work and Pensions. The HSE accident statistics are
based on notifications by employers and the self-employed. There are three
categories of injuries (accidents): fatal injuries, major injuries51 and those resulting
in an absence from work for more than 3 days. Like in Germany, access to the
database for people outside the HSE is limited.52 Also, like the HVBG in Germany
(and Prevent in Belgium), the HSE regularly publishes sector/industry studies.
Table 7 presents historical injury figures for the private sector. The figures
indicate a (non-linear) downward trend in the number of reported fatal injuries.
With respect to major injuries, we note a big change around 1996 that has been
caused by a change in the reporting regulations.53 In recent years the number of
reported major injuries has increased almost every year, according to the HSE
mainly in service industries. The number of over-3-day injuries has remained fairly
constant as far as employees are concerned (except for the 2004/2005 number),
while concerning self-employed the drop in 1996/1997 probably resulted again from
the changes in reporting regulations.
The private sector injury rates in Table 8 show a similar picture. Here it concerns
the number of reported accidents per 100,000 members of the workforce. There was
a general downward trend in the rate of fatal injuries in the 1990s, but it has risen
twice since then. The fact that the fatal injury rate is higher for the self-employed
than for employees, according to the HSE reflects the fact that proportionally more
self-employed people than employees work in the higher risk industries of
agriculture and construction. In addition it should be noted that the rate of fatal
injuries of the self-employed is more susceptible to change because there are much
less self-employed people than employees.54 The rise in the rate of major injuries of
employees between 2001 and 2003 was, as mentioned earlier, mainly caused in
service industries. Before that (and again in 2004) this rate fell steadily, also for the
self-employed. The rate of over-3-day injuries of employees has gradually
decreased from the mid 1990s, with an exception in 2003/2004, but with respect
to the self-employed it has been rising again since 2001/2002.
On its website the HSC argues that the activities of the HSC and local agencies
have been important in cutting the accident rate since the 1970s, but it also
51 Major injuries include amputations and fractures and other injuries leading to resuscitation or 24-h
admittance to hospital. See Health and Safety Commission, Health and Safety Statistics 2005/06 (2006),
26.
52 European Health and Safety Database (HASTE): http://www.ttl.fi/internet/haste, 23 February 2007.
53 More particularly, a change from RIDDOR 85 to RIDDOR 95. RIDDOR stands for Reporting of
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurences Regulations.
54 HSE, Health and Safety Statistics Highlights 2003/04 (2004), p. 4.
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acknowledges other factors, such as the occupational composition of employment
(such as the balance between manual and non-manual occupations) and changes in
public attitute towards risk. A recent study commissioned by the HSE found that the
rates of major injury follow a pro-cyclical pattern over the course of the business
cycle, related to the incidence of new hires over the business cycle (i.e. during an
economic boom).55 Another conclusion of this study was that the dominant
influence that contributes to a worker’s risk of injury is his or her occupation. Injury
rates are expected to decline further, but many challenges remain according to the
HSC, such as the increasing number of part-time workers, developments in the
private services sector, and occupational diseases.56 To what extent the Employers’
Liability System has contibuted to the prevention of accidents is unclear. However, I
already noted above that there have recently been some discussions regarding the
functioning (insurability) of this sytem.
Table 7 Reported occupational injuries in the private sector 1986/1987–2005/2006
Yeara Employees Self-employed
Fatal Major Over 3 days Fatal Major Over 3 days
1986/1987 355 20,695 159,011 52 690 1,029
1987/1988 361 20,057 159,852 84 867 1,169
1988/1989 529 19,944 163,119 80 1,152 1,503
1989/1990 370 20,396 165,244 105 1,310 1,865
1990/1991 346 19,896 160,811 87 1,326 2,077
1991/1992 297 17,597 152,506 71 1,101 1,832
1992/1993 276 16,938 141,147 63 1,115 2,136
1993/1994 245 16,705 134,928 51 1,274 2,531
1994/1995 191 17,041 139,349 81 1,313 2,869
1995/1996 209 16,568 130,582 49 1,166 2,394
1996/1997 207 27,964 127,286 80 1,356 2,282
1997/1998 212 29,187 134,789 62 815 984
1998/1999 188 28,368 132,295 65 685 849
1999/2000 162 28,652 135,381 58 663 732
2000/2001 213 27,524 134,105 79 630 715
2001/2002 206 28,011 129,655 45 929 917
2002/2003 183 28,113 128,184 44 1,079 951
2003/2004 168 30,689 131,017 68 1,283 1,114
2004/2005 172 30,451 121,779 51 1,251 1,143
2005/2006p 160 28,605 117,471 52 1,251 1,174
Sources: HSE, Historical Injury Figures (2005) and Health and Safety Commission, Health and Safety
Statistics 2005/2006 (2006). Numbers for 2005/2006 are provisional (after correction they are usually
higher)
a Figures are based on a planning year 1 April–31 March
55 Davies and Jones (2005).
56 http://www.hse.gov.uk, 23 February 2007.
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5.2 Compensation
As explained above, income losses resulting from industrial accidents can be
compensated either via the Employers’ Liability Act (if a tort claim is successful) or
via the Industrial Injury Disablement Benefit (IIDB) in social security. Compen-
sation via social security is limited and standardised, but it does not involve fault
being established. It needs to be established that the injury is work related and that
the degree of disability, judged by a medical examination, is at least 14%. An IIDB
benefit provides for the following: a disablement benefit, which is linked to the
degree of disablement; a constant attendance allowance (CAA) to distinguish
between full-time and part-time workers; an unemployability supplement; and an
allowance that is only paid out in exceptionally severe cases where moreover
disablement is likely to be permanent.57 Some examples of the standardised
amounts paid out in 2006/2007 are as follows. Disablement benefits (pensions) are
set at fixed weekly amounts: for example £101.68 for 80% disablement, £63.55 for
Table 8 Reported occupational accidents in the private sector: incidence rates (per 100,000)a
Yearb Employees Self-employed
Fatal Major Over 3 days Fatal Major Over 3 days
1986/1987 1.7 99.1 761.1 2.0 26.9 40.1
1987/1988 1.7 94.0 748.9 3.0 31.0 41.4
1988/1989 2.4 91.4 747.7 2.7 39.4 51.4
1989/1990 1.7 91.8 743.4 3.3 41.2 58.6
1990/1991 1.6 89.9 726.5 2.7 41.2 64.5
1991/1992 1.4 81.7 708.5 2.3 35.9 64.5
1992/1993 1.3 80.3 669.0 2.0 35.8 68.5
1993/1994 1.2 79.3 640.2 1.6 40.6 80.7
1994/1995 0.9 80.4 657.2 2.5 40.4 88.4
1995/1996 1.0 77.1 607.4 1.5 36.0 73.8
1996/1997 0.9 127.5 580.1 2.3 38.4 64.6
1997/1998 0.9 127.6 589.2 1.8 23.3 28.1
1998/1999 0.8 121.7 567.3 1.9 20.3 25.2
1999/2000 0.7 116.6 550.9 1.7 19.7 21.8
2000/2001 0.9 110.2 536.9 2.4 19.2 21.8
2001/2002 0.8 110.9 513.5 1.3 27.8 27.5
2002/2003 0.7 111.1 506.5 1.3 32.3 28.4
2003/2004 0.7 120.4 514.2 1.8 33.9 29.5
2004/2005 0.7 117.9 471.7 1.3 33.0 30.2
2005/2006p 0.6 110.1 452.2 1.4 32.9 30.8
a Supra, fn. 54
b Supra, fn. 56
57 Department for Work and Pensions (supra fn. 50), 16–17, and http://www.dwp.gov.uk, 23 February
2007. There is also an industrial death benefit, which I will not discuss here.
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50% disablement, and £38.13 for 30% disablement. Similarly, CAA is set at fixed
amounts such as £101.80 for exceptional rate versus £25.45 for part-time rate. The
unemployability supplement is £78.50 per week with additions for early incapacity,
and the exceptionally severe disablement allowance is £50.90.58
Damages following a succesful tort claim include compensation for loss of
earnings, health care costs, and pain and suffering. Contributory negligence on the part
of the employee would reduce the damages. Unfortunately, there appears to be little
information on the amounts of compensation paid out and the number of tort claims
and settlements in Great Britain,59 although the Association of British Insurers has
argued that the average size of employers’ liability claims has doubled between 1998
and 2003, mainly due to ‘‘legal changes and general award inflation’’.60
In 2004 the HSE’s Economic Advisers Unit published an interim report on the
‘‘Costs to Britain of Workplace Accidents and Work-Related Ill Health’’, which
includes estimations of employers’ liability costs. The report provides some broad
indications of the costs to individuals, employers and society of work-related
incidents in Great Britain, based on 2001/2002 data. Cost categories to individuals
include lost earnings, extra expenditure when absent and ‘‘pain, grief and
suffering’’. Costs to employers include compensation (via employers’ liability),
sick pay (excluding statutory sick pay) and others such as administration, insurance
and recruitment costs. Costs to society consist of costs of medical treatment (NHS),
loss of output, HSE investigation costs, ‘‘pain, grief and suffering’’ and others.61
The estimations presented in the report are as follows62: (Table 9).
6 Concluding remarks
Focusing on private sector data, the figures presented in this paper indicate that in
Belgium, Germany and Great Britain the reported accident rates have shown a
Table 9 Costs of workplace
incidents 2001/2002 (9 bln. £)
Injury Ill Health
Costs to individuals 3.3–6.3 5.9–9.4
Costs to employers 1.0–1.1 1.5
Costs to society 5.9–10.7 11.3–17.3
Costs to the economy 3.2–6.2 7.6–11.6
58 Department for Work and Pensions, Social Security Benefit Rates, 2006, 18–19. The rates given here
applied as of 10 April 2006.
59 Some older and rather crude estimations of the number of tort claims can be found in Cane (1999),
179.
60 Department for Work and Pensions (supra fn. 50), 52.
61 A figure representing the different cost categories can be found in the Economic Advisers Unit report,
which is available at http://www.hse.gov.uk, 23 February 2007.
62 Source: HSE. The original tables also include non-injury accident costs, representing the cost of
damage to materials, machinery and property.
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downward trend in recent years, both for fatal accidents and for serious accidents.
There is only one exception, the rate of serious accidents (major and over-3-day
injuries) in Great Britain, which has risen recently due to more reported accidents in
the service industry. Naturally, to an important extent the decrease in accidents can
be explained by changes in the economic structure (e.g. the decline of heavy
industry) and changes in the general attitude towards risk. In Belgium the
decreasing trend has been ascribed also to investments in health and safety by
employers (see Sect. 3). However, it is unfortunately unclear to what extent these
investments resulted from preventive efforts by the government or liability insurers.
As regards the latter it is important to note that the government has proposed to
make insurance premiums more experience-related, which suggests there is some
need to improve on the current financing system. Also in Great Britian it has been
proposed recently to make premiums in employers’ liability insurance better reflect
individual risk (see Sect. 5). The decrease in the fatality rate in Great Britain has
rather been ascribed to preventive efforts by the HSC and local agencies, in addition
to the more general factors mentioned above. In Germany, where the decrease in all
categories of accidents seems to be most apparent, the preventive efforts of the BGs
have been mentioned as a main factor, in addition to again changes in the economic
structure (see Sect. 4). The BGs are responsible for both prevention and
compensation, which may have contributed to the fact that in Germany employers’
contributions already are relatively risk-related and experience-related. This leads to
an interesting proposition for further research, namely that giving an organisation
the responsibility for both compensation and prevention may have a beneficial effect
on the accident rate.
Unfortunately it is impossible to state to what extent the different compensation
systems have had an influence on the prevention of accidents.63 One could even
argue that this influence is limited, as these countries with their different
compensation systems all show the same trend. More detailed empirical data are
needed to substantiate any claims about the causality between the number of
accidents, the compensation system and other variables, but such data are simply
not available. One of the aims of this paper has been to show some of the
problems in collecting such data. Nevertheless, we have seen that Belgium,
Germany and Great Britain all have systems that include at least some preventive
elements, notably in the way those systems are financed. However, we have seen
also that in insurance-based systems it is important to relate premiums to the
individual accident risk or accident history, in order to utilize the preventive
effects in the system. In that respect there appears to be room for ‘improvement’
in both the Belgian no-fault insurance and the British liability insurance systems.
Moreover, in case of insurability problems, as observed to some extent in Great
Britain, the danger of underdeterrence looms ahead. After all, liability rules can
only work if employers are capable of paying for the full magnitude of harm done
to an employee victim and not in cases of insolvency.64 As regards compensation,
it should be noted that in all countries the amounts paid out are standardised, and
63 See on the problem of measuring this relationship also Ko¨tz and Scha¨fer (1993), 20–21.
64 See in that respect also Shavell (1984), p. 360.
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hence limited.65 This applies to the FAO in Belgium, the BGs in Germany, and
the IIDB in Great Britain. Of course, it does not apply (necessarily) to succesful
tort claims in Great Britain following the Employers’ Liability Act. There,
however, fault of the employer needs to be proven. In Belgium and Germany
access to tort law is almost, but not completely, excluded.
Industrial accident statistics cannot easily be compared between countries,
because there are no uniform definitions. For example, countries may or may not
include road traffic accidents and commuting accidents in their statistics, and some
countries only have limited information on public sector accidents and on the self-
employed. Furthermore, in some countries the definition of ‘‘serious’’ accidents is
based on at least one working day lost (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands) while in
other countries this threshold is three working days (e.g. Germany and Great
Britain).66 We also have to keep in mind that even the seemingly simple-to-interpret
statistics on accident rates in one country should always be handled with care,
because of possible changes over time in reporting regulations and presentation of
data (see Great Britain and Germany). For all of these reasons (and more) I did not
attempt to conduct a more elaborate comparative study. However, I hope that the data
presented in this paper and my focus on the different compensation systems and their
preventive effects will encourage further empirical research in this important
domain. Many challenges lay ahead, especially on the sectoral level (e.g. the
construction industry or wood industry), where the problem of uniformity of
definitions is less severe and comparable empirical data can more easily be obtained.
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